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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
ROBERT A. McKENNA*

It is difficult to understand why in Florida, where real estate transactions with the usual promissory notes and accompanying mortgages are
most numerous, there should be only one case on negotiable instruments
decided during the period of this survey. In the same two years approximately twenty were considered in Louisiana. In any event, the author
has only one decision of the Florida Supreme Court to report. I have
included a decision of the U.S. District Court believing it to be of some
interest to Florida attorneys. The Florida amendment to the Negotiable
Instruments Law, also noted, deals with a problem which will be familiar
to recent graduates from law school, but probably long since forgotten by
other attorneys.
Negotiability and Rights of a Holder in Due Course
In Wright v. Board of Public Instruction1 certain time warrants were
issued by the defendant. Each warrant provided that it was "payable out
of the Common School fund of Sumter County" and that the "full faith,
credit and resources of the said Board of Public Instruction ...are pledged
for the . . . payment . . . hereof." These instrunents were purchased by a
Florida bank and, shortly thereafter, received by a Maryland bank, as
security for a debt, without knowledge that full consideration had not
been paid by the Florida bank. Subsequently, after acquiring knowledge
of this defect the Maryland bank acquired complete title to the warrants
by a compromise agreement with the liquidator of the Florida bank. The
plaintiff then purchased those which had not been retired, having a face
value of $20,000, for $3,600. In the lower court it was held that the
instruments were not negotiable and, hence, the Board's defense of partial
failure of consideration was good. A judgment for $14,800, principal and
interest, plus costs, was nevertheless rendered. On this appeal by the
plaintiff it was held that the warrants were negotiable, as plaintiff contended, but that plaintiff's recovery would be limited to the amount of
the debt, plus interest, owed to the Maryland bank by the Florida bank,
as the former would be a holder in due course only to the extent of this
lien. Since some $5,000 of the original debt of $15,000 had been paid
off it would appear that plaintiff's appeal was not monetarily, at least,
particularly successful.
Under the N.I.L. § 1,2 an instrument to be negotiable must contain an
unconditional promise or order to pay. Obviously, a promise to pay "out
*Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.

1. 77 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1955).
2. FLA. STAT. § 674.02 (1953).
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of a particular fund" is conditional upon the existence of that fund, so
that such a promise would render the instrument non-negotiable; it being
expressly so provided. 3 Under the same section "an indication of a particular
fund out of which reimbursement is to be made, or a particular account
to be debited with the amount" will not impair negotiability. The
distinction between the two is generally determined by resolving whether
or not the promissor is pledging his general credit; if he is, the promise
is unconditional. 4 In the principal case 5 we have an indication of the
County School Fund out of which payment is to be made, and a pledge
of the general credit of the Board of Public Instruction. In effect the
decision of the court affirms the proposition that, in certain instances,
a pledge of the general credit of a non-corporate entity may not be a
promise to pay out of a particular fund within the meaning of the rule
that such a promise destroys negotiability. Of course the promise of
a legal corporate entity which restricts the obligation to the corporate
assets is clearly not conditional.
The difficulty seems to be in comprehending a pledge of the general credit of a non-legal entity, like a
partnership or even a huge business trust, where the promise is to pay
"out of" the assets of the partnership or the trust.' Here the Florida
Court simply ignored the difficulty which, of course, is the easiest means
of reaching a good result.
The decision affirms, without contest, the generally accepted rule, not
before passed upon in Florida, that N.I.L § 251 in effect makes a negotiation
as collateral security for an antecedent debt, a negotiation for value within
the meaning of the provision that requires a holder in due course to be
a holder for value.9 Under N.I.L. § 2710 such a holder can recover on the
instrument "to the extent of his lien" free and clear of personal defenses,
as he would be a holder in due course only to that extent." Under
N.I.L. § 5812 the plaintiff, in the principal case, would get only the
rights of the former holder in due course, the Maryland bank.
In Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Ste pp t1 the defendant, in
an action brought on a promissory note, unsuccessfully based his defense
of failure of consideration upon the authority of Mutual Finance Co. v.
Martin.1 4 In that case the court held that the finance company, indorsee
3.

FLA. STAT.

§ 674.04 (1953).

NOTEs 56 (1943).
5. See note I supra.
6.BRIToN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW Or BILLS AND NOTES 58 (1943).
7. Lorimer v. McGreevy, 229 Mo. App. 970, 84 S.W. 2d 667 (1935).
8. FLA. STAT. § 674.28 (1953).
9. FLA. STAT. § 674.54 (1953).
10. FLA. STAT. § 674.30 (1953).
11. FLA. STAT. § 674.59 (1953).
12. FLA. STAT. § 674.60 (1953); Wiers v. White, 142 Fla. 628, 196 So. 206
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of the note, was so closcly connected as to be almost identified with the
payee and hence could not be considered a holder in due course. Conscquently the defense of failure of consideration interposed by the defendant
was good. In the principal case, the District Court for the Northern
District of Florida refused to hold that the mere providing of the note
and conditional sales contract forms, with an advertisement of the plaintiff
in an upper corner of the latter, established such a relationship between
the payee, conditional seller, and the Citizens and Southern National Bank
as would prevent the latter from being a holder in due course. The case
might well be of some value to attorneys for finance companies alarmed
by the decision in the Mutual Finance Co. case. It does constitute
persuasive authority to the effect that that decision should be strictly
limited to the fact situation which practically identified the payee, conditional seller and the indorsee, finance company.
Statutory Changes
In the General Session of 1955, effective June 16, Section 9, Subsection
3 of the N.I.L. 1 was amended in Florida by adding the following italicized
portion: "The instrument is payable to bearer . . . (3) when it is payable
to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known
to the person making it so payable or known to his employee, or other
agent who supplies the name of such payee."
N.I.L. § 9(3), the unitalicized above provision, has almost uniformly
been held to also apply to instruments payable to a real existing person
whom the maker or drawer does not intend to receive payment.18 The
usual type of case under this section is where the treasurer of a corporation,
authorized to sign checks on the corporation's account, draws a check to
the order of either a fictitious or real creditor of the corporation, never
intending the named payee to receive payment. Instead the treasurer
forges the indorsement of the named payee and cashes the check for his
own benefit. On discovering the fraud the corporation brings action
against the drawee bank to force it to re-credit the corporation's account
with the amount of the check on the theory that the bank did not pay
out according to order but under a forged indorsement. Applying the above
section of the N.I.L., the court will hold that the intent of the treasurer
is imputed to the corporation and hence the instrument is payable to
bearer. The drawee bank, then, is justified in paying the bearer and may
debit the corporation's account. 17 However, a contrary result was generally
reached if the fraud was committed, not by the person who actually drew
15. FLA. STAT. § 674.11 (3)(1955).

16. BRITTON, IANDBOOK ON 'rnE LAw OF BILLS ANi NOTES 700. In Johnson v.
Exchange National Bank, 9 So.2d 810, 152 Fla. 228 (1942) the court stated "fictitiousness
does not depend upon the actual existence or non-existence of the payee, but on the
intention of the drawer and the payee's right to the proceeds."
17. BRITTON, supra at 701.
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the checks, but by another agent who supplied the name of the payee.
Only the intent of the person who actually drew the check, stated the
courts, controlled the character of the instrument"' and the drawee bank
would have to re-credit the amount paid out under the forged indorsements.
Quite naturally the banks did not appreciate this state of affairs and the
American Bankers Association recommended the amendment which has
been heretofore adopted in a number of states. In Florida, then, as of
June 16, 1955, a genuine indorsement of the payee is not necessary to a
transfer of title to a negotiable instrument either where the person executing
the instrument, or his agent who supplied the name, never intended the
named payee to receive payment. Such an instrument will be treated
just as though it were payable to bearer on its face.

18. Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So.651(1918); U.S.
Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E.825 (1931).

